gh-118224: When in FIPS mode ensure builtin hashes check for usedforsecurity=False #127300
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…edforsecurity=False When _hashlib/OpenSSL is available, and OpenSSL is in FIPS mode, ensure that builtin (fallback) hash implementations are wrapped with a check for usedforsecurity=False. It is likely that buitin implementations are FIPS unapproved (either algorithm disallowed; or the implementation not certified by NIST). This enables strict approved-only compliance when usedforsecurity=True on FIPS systems only. And yet it also enables fallback access with usedforsecurity=False for any missing (historical, disallowed or missing certified implementation) algorithms (i.e. blake2, md5, shake/sha3) depending on the runtime configuration of OpenSSL.
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When _hashlib/OpenSSL is available, and OpenSSL is in FIPS mode,
ensure that builtin (fallback) hash implementations are wrapped with a
check for usedforsecurity=False. It is likely that buitin
implementations are FIPS unapproved (either algorithm disallowed; or
the implementation not certified by NIST).
This enables strict approved-only compliance when usedforsecurity=True
on FIPS systems only.
And yet it also enables fallback access with usedforsecurity=False for
any missing (historical, disallowed or missing certified
implementation) algorithms (i.e. blake2, md5, shake/sha3) depending on
the runtime configuration of OpenSSL.