[Security Rules] Update security rules package to v8.12.1-beta.1 (ela…

…stic#8714)

* [Security Rules] Update security rules package to v8.12.1-beta.1

* Add changelog entry for 8.12.1-beta.1

packages/security_detection_engine/changelog.yml

@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
 # newer versions go on top
 # NOTE: please use pre-release versions (e.g. -beta.0) until a package is ready for production
+- version: 8.12.1-beta.1
+  changes:
+    - description: Release security rules update
+      type: enhancement
+      link: https://github.com/elastic/integrations/pull/8714
 - version: 8.11.4
   changes:
     - description: Release security rules update

packages/security_detection_engine/kibana/security_rule/000047bb-b27a-47ec-8b62-ef1a5d2c9e19_102.json

@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@
         ],
         "threat": [
             {
-                "framework": "MITRE ATT\u0026CK",
+                "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK",
                 "tactic": {
                     "id": "TA0005",
                     "name": "Defense Evasion",

packages/security_detection_engine/kibana/security_rule/000047bb-b27a-47ec-8b62-ef1a5d2c9e19_103.json

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
         ],
         "threat": [
             {
-                "framework": "MITRE ATT\u0026CK",
+                "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK",
                 "tactic": {
                     "id": "TA0005",
                     "name": "Defense Evasion",

packages/security_detection_engine/kibana/security_rule/000047bb-b27a-47ec-8b62-ef1a5d2c9e19_104.json

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
         ],
         "threat": [
             {
-                "framework": "MITRE ATT\u0026CK",
+                "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK",
                 "tactic": {
                     "id": "TA0005",
                     "name": "Defense Evasion",

packages/security_detection_engine/kibana/security_rule/000047bb-b27a-47ec-8b62-ef1a5d2c9e19_105.json

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
         ],
         "threat": [
             {
-                "framework": "MITRE ATT\u0026CK",
+                "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK",
                 "tactic": {
                     "id": "TA0005",
                     "name": "Defense Evasion",

packages/security_detection_engine/kibana/security_rule/000047bb-b27a-47ec-8b62-ef1a5d2c9e19_106.json

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
         ],
         "threat": [
             {
-                "framework": "MITRE ATT\u0026CK",
+                "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK",
                 "tactic": {
                     "id": "TA0005",
                     "name": "Defense Evasion",

packages/security_detection_engine/kibana/security_rule/000047bb-b27a-47ec-8b62-ef1a5d2c9e19_207.json

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
         ],
         "threat": [
             {
-                "framework": "MITRE ATT\u0026CK",
+                "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK",
                 "tactic": {
                     "id": "TA0005",
                     "name": "Defense Evasion",

packages/security_detection_engine/kibana/security_rule/00140285-b827-4aee-aa09-8113f58a08f3_105.json

@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@
         ],
         "risk_score": 73,
         "rule_id": "00140285-b827-4aee-aa09-8113f58a08f3",
-        "setup": "If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions \u003c8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.",
+        "setup": "If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.",
         "severity": "high",
         "tags": [
             "Elastic",
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@
         ],
         "threat": [
             {
-                "framework": "MITRE ATT\u0026CK",
+                "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK",
                 "tactic": {
                     "id": "TA0006",
                     "name": "Credential Access",

packages/security_detection_engine/kibana/security_rule/00140285-b827-4aee-aa09-8113f58a08f3_106.json

@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
         ],
         "risk_score": 73,
         "rule_id": "00140285-b827-4aee-aa09-8113f58a08f3",
-        "setup": "If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions \u003c8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.",
+        "setup": "If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.",
         "severity": "high",
         "tags": [
             "Elastic",
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@
         ],
         "threat": [
             {
-                "framework": "MITRE ATT\u0026CK",
+                "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK",
                 "tactic": {
                     "id": "TA0006",
                     "name": "Credential Access",

packages/security_detection_engine/kibana/security_rule/00140285-b827-4aee-aa09-8113f58a08f3_107.json

@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
         ],
         "risk_score": 73,
         "rule_id": "00140285-b827-4aee-aa09-8113f58a08f3",
-        "setup": "If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions \u003c8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.",
+        "setup": "If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.",
         "severity": "high",
         "tags": [
             "Domain: Endpoint",
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@
         ],
         "threat": [
             {
-                "framework": "MITRE ATT\u0026CK",
+                "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK",
                 "tactic": {
                     "id": "TA0006",
                     "name": "Credential Access",

packages/security_detection_engine/kibana/security_rule/00140285-b827-4aee-aa09-8113f58a08f3_108.json

@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
         ],
         "risk_score": 73,
         "rule_id": "00140285-b827-4aee-aa09-8113f58a08f3",
-        "setup": "If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions \u003c8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.",
+        "setup": "If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.",
         "severity": "high",
         "tags": [
             "Domain: Endpoint",
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@
         ],
         "threat": [
             {
-                "framework": "MITRE ATT\u0026CK",
+                "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK",
                 "tactic": {
                     "id": "TA0006",
                     "name": "Credential Access",

packages/security_detection_engine/kibana/security_rule/00140285-b827-4aee-aa09-8113f58a08f3_109.json

@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
         ],
         "risk_score": 73,
         "rule_id": "00140285-b827-4aee-aa09-8113f58a08f3",
-        "setup": "If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions \u003c8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.",
+        "setup": "If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.",
         "severity": "high",
         "tags": [
             "Domain: Endpoint",
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@
         ],
         "threat": [
             {
-                "framework": "MITRE ATT\u0026CK",
+                "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK",
                 "tactic": {
                     "id": "TA0006",
                     "name": "Credential Access",
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@
                 ]
             },
             {
-                "framework": "MITRE ATT\u0026CK",
+                "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK",
                 "tactic": {
                     "id": "TA0005",
                     "name": "Defense Evasion",

packages/security_detection_engine/kibana/security_rule/00140285-b827-4aee-aa09-8113f58a08f3_110.json

@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
         ],
         "risk_score": 73,
         "rule_id": "00140285-b827-4aee-aa09-8113f58a08f3",
-        "setup": "\nIf enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions \u003c8.2,\nevents will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.\nHence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate\n`event.ingested` to @timestamp.\nFor more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html\n",
+        "setup": "\nIf enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,\nevents will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.\nHence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate\n`event.ingested` to @timestamp.\nFor more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html\n",
         "severity": "high",
         "tags": [
             "Domain: Endpoint",
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@
         ],
         "threat": [
             {
-                "framework": "MITRE ATT\u0026CK",
+                "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK",
                 "tactic": {
                     "id": "TA0006",
                     "name": "Credential Access",
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@
                 ]
             },
             {
-                "framework": "MITRE ATT\u0026CK",
+                "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK",
                 "tactic": {
                     "id": "TA0005",
                     "name": "Defense Evasion",

packages/security_detection_engine/kibana/security_rule/0022d47d-39c7-4f69-a232-4fe9dc7a3acd_104.json

@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@
         ],
         "risk_score": 47,
         "rule_id": "0022d47d-39c7-4f69-a232-4fe9dc7a3acd",
-        "setup": "If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions \u003c8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.",
+        "setup": "If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.",
         "severity": "medium",
         "tags": [
             "Elastic",
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@
         ],
         "threat": [
             {
-                "framework": "MITRE ATT\u0026CK",
+                "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK",
                 "tactic": {
                     "id": "TA0003",
                     "name": "Persistence",

packages/security_detection_engine/kibana/security_rule/0022d47d-39c7-4f69-a232-4fe9dc7a3acd_105.json

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
         "language": "eql",
         "license": "Elastic License v2",
         "name": "System Shells via Services",
-        "note": "## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating System Shells via Services\n\nAttackers may configure existing services or create new ones to execute system shells to elevate their privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. They can also configure services to execute these shells with persistence payloads.\n\nThis rule looks for system shells being spawned by `services.exe`, which is compatible with the above behavior.\n\n\u003e **Note**:\n\u003e This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify how the service was created or modified. Look for registry changes events or Windows events related to service activities (for example, 4697 and/or 7045).\n  - Examine the created and existent services, the executables or drivers referenced, and command line arguments for suspicious entries.\n    - !{osquery{\"label\":\"Osquery - Retrieve All Services\",\"query\":\"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services\"}}\n    - !{osquery{\"label\":\"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts\",\"query\":\"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\\nuser_account == null)\\n\"}}\n    - !{osquery{\"label\":\"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link\",\"query\":\"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\\n\"}}\n  - Retrieve the referenced files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.\n- Check for commands executed under the spawned shell.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity should not happen legitimately. The security team should address any potential benign true positive (B-TP), as this configuration can put the user and the domain at risk.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Delete the service or restore it to the original configuration.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n",
+        "note": "## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating System Shells via Services\n\nAttackers may configure existing services or create new ones to execute system shells to elevate their privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. They can also configure services to execute these shells with persistence payloads.\n\nThis rule looks for system shells being spawned by `services.exe`, which is compatible with the above behavior.\n\n> **Note**:\n> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify how the service was created or modified. Look for registry changes events or Windows events related to service activities (for example, 4697 and/or 7045).\n  - Examine the created and existent services, the executables or drivers referenced, and command line arguments for suspicious entries.\n    - !{osquery{\"label\":\"Osquery - Retrieve All Services\",\"query\":\"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services\"}}\n    - !{osquery{\"label\":\"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts\",\"query\":\"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\\nuser_account == null)\\n\"}}\n    - !{osquery{\"label\":\"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link\",\"query\":\"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\\n\"}}\n  - Retrieve the referenced files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.\n- Check for commands executed under the spawned shell.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity should not happen legitimately. The security team should address any potential benign true positive (B-TP), as this configuration can put the user and the domain at risk.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Delete the service or restore it to the original configuration.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n",
         "query": "process where host.os.type == \"windows\" and event.type == \"start\" and\n  process.parent.name : \"services.exe\" and\n  process.name : (\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\", \"pwsh.exe\", \"powershell_ise.exe\") and\n\n  /* Third party FP's */\n  not process.args : \"NVDisplay.ContainerLocalSystem\"\n",
         "related_integrations": [
             {
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
         ],
         "threat": [
             {
-                "framework": "MITRE ATT\u0026CK",
+                "framework": "MITRE ATT&CK",
                 "tactic": {
                     "id": "TA0003",
                     "name": "Persistence",