doc: document build id and GCB vs GHA (slsa-framework#266)

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laurentsimon · Sep 23, 2022 · b5da86b · b5da86b
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diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
@@ -1,18 +1,29 @@
 # Verification of SLSA provenance
-This repository contains the implementation for verifying [SLSA provenance](https://slsa.dev/). It currently supports verifying provenance generated by the [SLSA generator for Go projects](https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator/blob/main/.github/workflows/builder_go_slsa3.yml). We are working on support for verifying provenance for other ecosystems.
+This repository contains the implementation for verifying [SLSA provenance](https://slsa.dev/). It currently supports verifying provenance generated by:
+1. [SLSA generator](https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator)
+1. [Google Cloud Build (GCB)](https://cloud.google.com/build/docs/securing-builds/view-build-provenance).
 
 ________
 [Installation](#installation)
 - [Compilation from source](#compilation-from-source)
 - [Download the binary](#download-the-binary)
 
-[Verification of provenance](#verification-of-provenance)
-- [Available options](#available-options)
-- [Example](#example)
+[Available options](#available-options)
+- [Option list](#option-list)
+- [Option details](#option-details)
+
+[Verification for GitHub builders](#verification-for-github-builders)
+- [Artifacts](#artifacts)
+- [Containers](#containers)
+
+[Verification for Google Cloud Build](#verification-for-google-cloud-build)
+- [Artifacts](#artifacts-1)
+- [Containers](#containers-1)
 
 [Technical design](#technial-design)
 - [Blog posts](#blog-posts)
 - [Specifications](#specifications)
+- [TOCTOU attacks](#toctou-attacks)
 ________
 
 ## Installation
@@ -47,11 +58,11 @@ $ sha256sum -c --strict SHA256SUM.md
   slsa-verifier-linux-amd64: OK
 ```
 
-## Verification of Provenance
+## Available options
 
 We currently support artifact verification (for binary blobs) and container images.
 
-### Available options
+## Option list
 
 Below is a list of options currently supported for binary blobs and container images. Note that signature verification is handled seamlessly without the need for developers to manipulate public keys. See [Available options](#available-options) for details on the options exposed to validate the provenance.
 
@@ -75,29 +86,75 @@ Flags:
       --source-versioned-tag string   [optional] expected version the binary was compiled from. Uses semantic version to match the tag
 ```
 
-### Example
+### Option details
+
+The following options are supported for [SLSA GitHub builders and generators](https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator#generation-of-provenance):
+
+| Option | Description | Support
+| --- | ----------- | --------
+| `source-uri` | Expects a source, for e.g. `github.com/org/repo`. | All builders
+| `source-branch` | Expects a `branch` like `main` or `dev`. Not supported for all GitHub Workflow triggers. | GitHub builders only
+| `source-tag` | Expects a  `tag` like `v0.0.1`. Verifies exact tag used to create the binary. Supported for new [tag](https://github.com/slsa-framework/example-package/blob/main/.github/workflows/e2e.go.tag.main.config-ldflags-assets-tag.slsa3.yml#L5) and [release](https://github.com/slsa-framework/example-package/blob/main/.github/workflows/e2e.go.release.main.config-ldflags-assets-tag.slsa3.yml) triggers. | GitHub builders only
+| `source-versioned-tag` | Like `tag`, but verifies using semantic versioning. | GitHub builders only
+| `build-workflow-input` | Expects key-value pairs like `key=value` to match against [inputs](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-workflows/workflow-syntax-for-github-actions#onworkflow_dispatchinputs) for GitHub Actions `workflow_dispatch` triggers. | GitHub builders only
+
+## Verification for GitHub builders
+
+### Artifacts
+
+To verify an artifact, run the following command:
 
 ```bash
-$ go run ./cli/slsa-verifier -provenance-path ~/Downloads/slsa-verifier-linux-amd64.intoto.jsonl --source-uri github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-verifier --source-tag v1.3.0 ~/Downloads/slsa-verifier-linux-amd64 
+$ slsa-verifier verify-artifact slsa-test-linux-amd64 \
+  --provenance-path slsa-test-linux-amd64.intoto.jsonl \
+  --source-uri github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-test \
+  --source-tag v1.0.3
 Verified signature against tlog entry index 3189970 at URL: https://rekor.sigstore.dev/api/v1/log/entries/206071d5ca7a2346e4db4dcb19a648c7f13b4957e655f4382b735894059bd199
 Verified build using builder https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator/.github/workflows/builder_go_slsa3.yml@refs/tags/v1.2.0 at commit 5bb13ef508b2b8ded49f9264d7712f1316830d10
 PASSED: Verified SLSA provenance
 ```
 
 The verified in-toto statement may be written to stdout with the `--print-provenance` flag to pipe into policy engines.
 
-### Options Details
 
-The following options are supported for [SLSA GitHub builders and generators](https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator#generation-of-provenance):
+### Containers
+This is WIP and currently not supported.
+
+## Verification for Google Cloud Build
+
+### Artifacts
+This is WIP and currently not supported.
 
-| Option | Description |
-| --- | ----------- |
-| `source-uri` | Expects a source, for e.g. `github.com/org/repo`. |
-| `source-branch` | Expects a `branch` like `main` or `dev`. Not supported for all GitHub Workflow triggers. |
-| `source-tag` | Expects a  `tag` like `v0.0.1`. Verifies exact tag used to create the binary. NSupported for new [tag](https://github.com/slsa-framework/example-package/blob/main/.github/workflows/e2e.go.tag.main.config-ldflags-assets-tag.slsa3.yml#L5) and [release](https://github.com/slsa-framework/example-package/blob/main/.github/workflows/e2e.go.release.main.config-ldflags-assets-tag.slsa3.yml) triggers. |
-| `source-versioned-tag` | Like `tag`, but verifies using semantic versioning. |
-| `build-workflow-input` | Expects key-value pairs like `key=value` to match against [inputs](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-workflows/workflow-syntax-for-github-actions#onworkflow_dispatchinputs) for GitHub Actions `workflow_dispatch` triggers. |
+### Containers
+To verify a contaimer image, you need to pass a container image name that is _immutable_ by providing its digest, in order to avoid [TOCTOU attacks](#toctou-attacks).
 
+Run the commands below:
+
+```bash
+$ IMAGE=laurentsimon/slsa-gcb-v0.3:test
+```
+
+Get the digest for your container _without_ pulling it using the [crane](https://github.com/google/go-containerregistry/blob/main/cmd/crane/doc/crane.md) command:
+```shell
+$ IMAGE="${IMAGE}@"$(crane digest "${IMAGE}")
+```
+
+Download the provenance:
+```shell
+$ gcloud artifacts docker images describe $IMAGE --format json --show-provenance > provenance.json
+```
+
+Verify the image:
+```bash
+$ slsa-verifier verify-image "$IMAGE" \
+  --provenance-path provenance.json \
+  --source-uri github.com/laurentsimon/gcb-tests \
+  --builder-id=https://cloudbuild.googleapis.com/GoogleHostedWorker
+
+PASSED: Verified SLSA provenance
+```
+
+The verified in-toto statement may be written to stdout with the `--print-provenance` flag to pipe into policy engines.
 
 ## Technical design
 
@@ -106,3 +163,8 @@ Find our blog post series [here](https://security.googleblog.com/2022/04/improvi
 
 ### Specifications
 For a more in-depth technical dive, read the [SPECIFICATIONS.md](https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator/blob/main/SPECIFICATIONS.md).
+
+### TOCTOU attacks
+As explained on [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time-of-check_to_time-of-use), a "time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) is a class of software bugs caused by a race condition involving the checking of the state of a part of a system and the use of the results of that check".
+
+In the context of provenance verification, imagine you verify a container refered to via a _mutable_ image `image:tag`. The verification succeeds and verifies the corresponding hash is `sha256:abcdef...`. After verification, you pull and run the image using `docker run image:tag`. An attacker could have altered the image between the verification step and the run step. To mitigate this attack, we ask users to always pass an _immutable_ reference to the artifact they verify.
diff --git a/cli/slsa-verifier/verify.go b/cli/slsa-verifier/verify.go
@@ -57,9 +57,6 @@ func verifyArtifactCmd() *cobra.Command {
 				v.SourceVersionTag = &o.SourceVersionTag
 			}
 			if cmd.Flags().Changed("builder-id") {
-				if !ExperimentalEnabled() {
-					return fmt.Errorf("builder-id only supported with experimental flag")
-				}
 				v.BuilderID = &o.BuilderID
 			}
 
@@ -109,9 +106,6 @@ func verifyImageCmd() *cobra.Command {
 				v.SourceVersionTag = &o.SourceVersionTag
 			}
 			if cmd.Flags().Changed("builder-id") {
-				if !ExperimentalEnabled() {
-					return fmt.Errorf("builder-id only supported with experimental flag")
-				}
 				v.BuilderID = &o.BuilderID
 			}
 

diff --git a/cli/slsa-verifier/verify/options.go b/cli/slsa-verifier/verify/options.go
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ func (o *VerifyOptions) AddFlags(cmd *cobra.Command) {
 	cmd.Flags().Var(&o.BuildWorkflowInputs, "build-workflow-input",
 		"[optional] a workflow input provided by a user at trigger time in the format 'key=value'. (Only for 'workflow_dispatch' events on GitHub Actions).")
 
-	cmd.Flags().StringVar(&o.BuilderID, "builder-id", "", "EXPERIMENTAL: the unique builder ID who created the provenance")
+	cmd.Flags().StringVar(&o.BuilderID, "builder-id", "", "the unique builder ID who created the provenance")
 
 	/* Source options */
 	cmd.Flags().StringVar(&o.SourceURI, "source-uri", "",