Advanced hunting queries for Microsoft Defender Security Center

This repo contains some personal queries I developed for MS Defender Security Center for known threats

Hope can be useful. If you find any FP or you want suggest some modification please send a PR

LOLBAS

Detection queries based on Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (LOLBAS) criteria

Certutil.exe

Certutil.exe is a Windows binary used for handeling certificates; the query detects download and encode/decode operations

DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName == "CertUtil.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "://" or ProcessCommandLine contains "-encode" or ProcessCommandLine contains "-decode"

Red Canary - detection of Ryuk ransomware

Detection opportunities highlighted in Red Canary blog post A Bazar start: How one hospital thwarted a Ryuk ransomware outbreak

Detection Opportunity 1: Process hollowing of cmd.exe

DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName == "cmd.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex "^$"
| where FileName has_any("net.exe", "explorer.exe", "nltest.exe")

Detection Opportunity 2: Enumerating domain trusts activity with nltest.exe

DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName == "nltest.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any("/dclist:", "/domain_trusts", "/all_trusts")

Detection Opportunity 3: Enumerating domain admins with net group

DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName == "net.exe"
// exclude local PC groups enumeration from the results, can generate FP
// e.g. you have hits for local groups when Defender ATP collects the investigation package
| where ProcessCommandLine !contains "localgroup"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "group"

Detection Opportunity 4: Process hollowing of explorer.exe

DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName == "svchost.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in ("services.exe", "MsMpEng.exe")
// exclude from the search parent process svchost.exe with -k option
| where not(InitiatingProcessFileName == "svchost.exe" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "-k")

TODO: I see some False Positive, try to improve the search

DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName == "svchost.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex "^$"
// exclude from the search parent process svchost.exe with -k option
| where not(InitiatingProcessFileName == "svchost.exe" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "-k")

Detection Opportunity 5: Attempted lateral movement via WMI + PowerShell + Cobalt Strike

DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName == "powershell.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "-encodedcommand"

DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName == "powershell.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName == "cmd.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessParentFileName == "wmiprvse.exe"

Detection Opportunity 6: Lateral movement via Cobalt Strike’s SMB PsExec module

DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName == "rundll32.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex "^$"

TODO: implemnent connection check for the process

Detection Opportunity 7: Enumerating enterprise administrator accounts

Check Detection Opportunity 3

Detection Opportunity 10: Adfind extracting information from Active Directory

DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName == "adfind.exe"

Vitali Kremez - detection of Ryuk ransomware

Detection steps highlighted in Vitali Kremez blog post Anatomy of Attack: Inside BazarBackdoor to Ryuk Ransomware "one" Group via Cobalt Strike

Step 4: Review the network of the host via "net view"

DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName == "net.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "view"
// exclude FP
| where ProcessCommandLine !contains "vmware-view-usbd"

Step 13: Grant net share full access to all for Ryuk ransomware

DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName == "net.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "share" and ProcessCommandLine contains "GRANT"

Check for a GRANT; on the post Vitali shows a FULL access to Everyone net share aaa$=C:\aaa /GRANT:Everyone,FULL

FireEye - Back in a Bit: Attacker Use of the Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service

Detection of bitsadmin.exe usage to download malware and create persistence as shown in FireEye post Back in a Bit: Attacker Use of the Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service

bitsadmin download activity

DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName == "bitsadmin.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "/addfile"

Check using bitsadmin to create a job that downloads an executable (malware) and stores it somewhere

bitsadmin create a persistent job activity

DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName == "bitsadmin.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "/SetNotifyCmdLine"

Check using bitsadmin to create a job to gain persistence