Independent container updates #1080
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It contains utilities to interact with OCI registries, like getting the list of published tags and getting the content of a manifest. It does so via the use of the Docker Registry API v2 [0]. The script has been added to the `dev_scripts`, and is also installed on the system under `dangerzone-image`. [0] https://docs.github.com/en/packages/working-with-a-github-packages-registry/working-with-the-container-registry
Signatures are stored in the OCI Manifest v2 registry [0], and are expected to follow the Cosign Signature Specification [0] The following CLI utilities are provided with `dangerzone-image`: For checking new container images, upgrading them and downloading them: - `upgrade` allows to upgrade the current installed image to the last one available on the OCI registry, downloading and storing the signatures in the process. - `verify-local` allows the verify the currently installed image against downloaded signatures and public key. To prepare and install archives on air-gapped environments: - `prepare-archive` helps to prepare an archive to install on another machine - `load-archive` helps upgrade the local image to the archive given in argument. Signatures are stored locally using the format provided by `cosign download signature`, and the Rekor log index is used to ensure the requested-to-install container image is fresher than the one already present on the system. [0] https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/blob/main/specs/SIGNATURE_SPEC.md
The hash list provided on the Github releases page is now bundled in the `reproduce-image.py` script, and the proper hashes are checked after download.
A new `dangerzone-image attest-provenance` script is now available, making it possible to verify the attestations of an image published on the github container registry. Container images are now build nightly and uploaded to the container registry.
This is done to avoid forgetting windows specific arguments when calling `subprocess.run`.
This function does all the needed checks before returning `True`, making it a good external API. Under the hood, the registry now has an `is_new_remote_image_available` which is just for checking the presence of a new image, but doesn't do any verirications on it, and there is also a new `check_signatures_and_logindex` that ensures that these two are valid.
The code making the actual requests and checks now lives in the `updater.releases` module. The code should be easier to read and to reason about. Tests have been updated to reflect this.
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This pull request introduces "independent container updates", meaning that the container images will be able to be updated without issuing a new release, allowing for greater security. You can read more about the rationale at #1006.
Signatures are meant to be done with an hardware key (yubikey), for which the public key will be packaged alongside the shipped code.
On container installation, the container signatures are stored locally and checked against a known public key just before doing the conversion of the documents. Behind the curtain, it uses cosign, which enables us to have auditable signatures (so if somebody is to impersonate us, they would need to do so in public).
Graphical interface
The graphical interface has been updated to ask users if they want Dangerzone to check for container updates and apply them on their behalf. The
updater_checksetting is now deprecated and replaced byupdater_icu_check.Command-line interface
It adds a
dangerzone-imageCLI providing tooling to check for remote new images, verification of the attestations and signatures, also with the ability to create and use archives, for air-gapped environments.It is fixing the following issues:
Current progress
Before being ready to be shipped, we still need to: