Update batch auction documentation

docs/cow-protocol/reference/core/auctions/bonding_pools.md

@@ -5,12 +5,12 @@ id: bonding-pools
 # Setting up a bonding pool
 The first step for setting up a bonding pool is to deploy a Gnosis safe on Mainnet with only [the CoW DAO safe](https://etherscan.io/address/0xcA771eda0c70aA7d053aB1B25004559B918FE662) as a signer, as is described in [CIP-7](https://snapshot.box/#/s:cow.eth/proposal/0x267edf7a0bd3c771cfca763322f011ee106d8d5158612c11da29183260d1dba7).
 
-Once this safe has been confirmed by the CoW DAO team, the safe should be funded with $500,000 USD in (yield bearing) stable coins and 1,500,000 COW tokens. After this is done, the bonding pool can be used to vouch for solvers in the solver competition.
+Once this safe has been confirmed by the CoW DAO team, the safe should be funded with \$500,000 USD in (yield bearing) stable coins and 1,500,000 COW tokens. After this is done, the bonding pool can be used to vouch for solvers in the solver competition.
 
 # Setting up a reduced bonding pool
 Solvers that are currently vouched under the CoW DAO Bonding pool may decide to set up a reduced bonding pool according to [CIP-44](https://snapshot.box/#/s:cow.eth/proposal/0x1b6f1171633ec3d20c4370db37074aa1bd830486d4d0d6c26165915cc42d9412), where the main benefit is that then they can fully control their calldata and the onchain submission process. Note that the interested solver team first needs to coordinate with the core team, that is currently managing the CoW DAO bonding pool, and the core team maintains the right to reject such a reduced pool setup.
 
-Assuming that the core team does approve the creation of a reduced bonding pool, the first step for setting up a reduced bonding pool is to deploy a Gnosis safe on Mainnet that has only one signer (the CoW DAO Solver Payouts safe, that is, eth:0xA03be496e67Ec29bC62F01a428683D7F9c204930). After this is done and has been confirmed by the CoW DAO team, the solver needs to deposit $50,000 in (yield bearing) stable coins or ETH, and 500,000 COW tokens to the newly created safe, and gradually build the pool's size all the way to $100,000 in (yield bearing) stable coins or ETH, and 1,000,000 COW tokens.
+Assuming that the core team approves the creation of a reduced bonding pool, the first step for setting up a reduced bonding pool is to deploy a Gnosis safe on Mainnet that has only one signer (the CoW DAO Solver Payouts safe, that is, eth:0xA03be496e67Ec29bC62F01a428683D7F9c204930). After this is done and has been confirmed by the CoW DAO team, the solver needs to deposit \$50,000 in (yield bearing) stable coins or ETH, and 500,000 COW tokens to the newly created safe, and gradually build the pool's size all the way to \$100,000 in (yield bearing) stable coins or ETH, and 1,000,000 COW tokens.
 
 We stress that the reduced bonding pool setup is just an arrangement within the CoW DAO bonding pool; meaning that the solver with a reduced bonding pool is still formally vouched under the CoW DAO bonding pool.
 

docs/cow-protocol/reference/core/auctions/competition_rules.md

@@ -22,11 +22,24 @@ All solvers participating in the solver competition must abide by certain rules.
 
 - A solution is valid only if it contains at least one user order.
 
-- Every solution is associated with a score, and the solutions are ranked in decreasing order of their scores. The solver whose solution has the highest positive score is declared the winner of the batch auction, and gets the right to execute its solution on-chain. Moreover, specifically for Ethereum Mainnet, the solver that provided the winning solution is also rewarded according to the rules specified in [CIP-20](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0x2d3f9bd1ea72dca84b03e97dda3efc1f4a42a772c54bd2037e8b62e7d09a491f). On the other hand, on Gnosis Chain solvers are not rewarded, and thus the score associated with a solution is simply equal to the quantity "surplus + fees - costs".
+- Every valid solution is associated with a score relative to the amount of surplus it generates for the users (as described in [CIP-38](https://snapshot.box/#/s:cow.eth/proposal/0xfb81daea9be89f4f1c251d53fd9d1481129b97c6f38caaddc42af7f3ce5a52ec). These solutions are ranked in decreasing order of their scores. The solver whose solution has the highest positive score (and generates the most amount of surplus for the user) is declared the winner of the batch auction, winning the right to execute its solution on-chain. Moreover, this solver that provided the winning solution is also rewarded according to the rules specified in [CIP-20](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0x2d3f9bd1ea72dca84b03e97dda3efc1f4a42a772c54bd2037e8b62e7d09a491f), [CIP-48](https://snapshot.box/#/s:cow.eth/proposal/0x563ab9a66265ad72c47a8e55f620f927685dd07d4d49f6d1812905c683f05805), and [CIP-57](https://snapshot.box/#/s:cow.eth/proposal/0x46d4fea1492207cf400fcb7a01141a7d4c730791d658cc77236941fc9eb7dccb).
 
-- Internalization of interactions (rule applies only on Ethereum Mainnet): a solver is allowed to "internalize" interactions whose buy token (i.e., the token that the AMM buys) is classified as a "trusted" token by the protocol. Concretely, if there is enough balance of the sell token of such an interaction in the settlement contract, then a solver can signal an internalization of such an interaction, which effectively means that the protocol is willing to buy and sell tokens stored in the settlement contract. The effect of such interactions is evaluated in what we call slippage accounting (see next point). 
+- Internalization of interactions: a solver is allowed to "internalize" interactions. Concretely, if there is enough balance of the sell token of such an interaction in the settlement contract, then a solver can signal an internalization of such an interaction, which effectively means that the protocol is willing to buy and sell tokens stored in the settlement contract. The effect of such interactions is evaluated in what we call slippage accounting (see next point).
 
-- Slippage accounting: With the exception of protocol, partner and network fees paid by users, any token imbalance within the settlement contract that is the result of a settlement is accounted for under the term "slippage accounting", and is fully owned by the corresponding solver, as specified in [CIP-17](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0xf9c98a2710dc72c906bbeab9b8fe169c1ed2e9af6a67776cc29b8b4eb44d0fb2). More information on the full accounting process, including slippage, can be found [here]((/cow-protocol/reference/core/auctions/accounting).
+- Slippage accounting: With the exception of protocol, partner and network fees paid by users, any token imbalance within the settlement contract that is the result of a settlement is accounted for under the term "slippage accounting", and is fully owned by the corresponding solver, as specified in [CIP-17](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0xf9c98a2710dc72c906bbeab9b8fe169c1ed2e9af6a67776cc29b8b4eb44d0fb2). More information on the full accounting process, including slippage, can be found [here](/cow-protocol/reference/core/auctions/accounting).
+
+- Deadline: Solvers that win an auction will receive a deadline by which they must settle the auction on-chain. If the transaction is not observed on chain before the deadline block is mined, then the solution will count as not submitted and the solver will be penalized.
+
+:::note
+
+The deadline for solutions depends on the network and is set a specific number of blocks after the current block at the time of sending the settle request to the solver:
+
+- Mainnet: 3 blocks
+- Arbitrum: 40 blocks
+- Gnosis chain: 5 blocks
+- Base: 20 blocks
+
+:::
 
 ## Governance
 
@@ -50,24 +63,31 @@ At CoW DAO's discretion, systematic violation of these rules may lead to penaliz
   <details>
     <summary>Ethereum mainnet baseline protocols and tokens</summary>
 
-    - **Protocols**: Uniswap v2/v3, Sushiswap, Swapr, Balancer v2
+    - **Protocols**: Uniswap v2/v3, Sushiswap, Swapr, Balancer v2, Pancakeswap
     - **Base tokens**: [`WETH`](https://etherscan.io/token/0xc02aaa39b223fe8d0a0e5c4f27ead9083c756cc2), [`DAI`](https://etherscan.io/token/0x6B175474E89094C44Da98b954EedeAC495271d0F), [`USDC`](https://etherscan.io/token/0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48), [`USDT`](https://etherscan.io/token/0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7), [`COMP`](https://etherscan.io/token/0xc00e94Cb662C3520282E6f5717214004A7f26888), [`MKR`](https://etherscan.io/token/0x9f8F72aA9304c8B593d555F12eF6589cC3A579A2), [`WBTC`](https://etherscan.io/token/0x2260FAC5E5542a773Aa44fBCfeDf7C193bc2C599), [`GNO`](https://etherscan.io/token/0x6810e776880C02933D47DB1b9fc05908e5386b96)
   </details>
 
   <details>
     <summary>Gnosis Chain baseline protocols and tokens</summary>
 
     - **Protocols**: Honeyswap, Sushiswap, Baoswap, Swapr, Balancer v2
-    - **Base tokens**: [`WXDAI`](https://gnosisscan.io/token/0xe91D153E0b41518A2Ce8Dd3D7944Fa863463a97d), [`HNY`](https://gnosisscan.io/token/0x71850b7e9ee3f13ab46d67167341e4bdc905eef9), [`USDT`](https://gnosisscan.io/token/0x4ECaBa5870353805a9F068101A40E0f32ed605C6), [`USDC`](https://gnosisscan.io/token/0xDDAfbb505ad214D7b80b1f830fcCc89B60fb7A83), [`sUSD`](https://gnosisscan.io/token/0xB1950Fb2C9C0CbC8553578c67dB52Aa110A93393), [`WBTC`](https://gnosisscan.io/token/0x8e5bbbb09ed1ebde8674cda39a0c169401db4252), [`GNO`](https://gnosisscan.io/token/0x9C58BAcC331c9aa871AFD802DB6379a98e80CEdb), [`STAKE`](https://gnosisscan.io/token/0xb7D311E2Eb55F2f68a9440da38e7989210b9A05e), [`xOWL`](https://gnosisscan.io/token/0x0905Ab807F8FD040255F0cF8fa14756c1D824931), [`WETH`](https://gnosisscan.io/token/0x6A023CCd1ff6F2045C3309768eAd9E68F978f6e1)
+    - **Base tokens**: [`WXDAI`](https://gnosisscan.io/token/0xe91D153E0b41518A2Ce8Dd3D7944Fa863463a97d), [`HNY`](https://gnosisscan.io/token/0x71850b7e9ee3f13ab46d67167341e4bdc905eef9), [`USDT`](https://gnosisscan.io/token/0x4ECaBa5870353805a9F068101A40E0f32ed605C6), [`USDC`](https://gnosisscan.io/token/0xDDAfbb505ad214D7b80b1f830fcCc89B60fb7A83), [`sUSD`](https://gnosisscan.io/token/0xB1950Fb2C9C0CbC8553578c67dB52Aa110A93393), [`WBTC`](https://gnosisscan.io/token/0x8e5bbbb09ed1ebde8674cda39a0c169401db4252), [`GNO`](https://gnosisscan.io/token/0x9C58BAcC331c9aa871AFD802DB6379a98e80CEdb), [`STAKE`](https://gnosisscan.io/token/0xb7D311E2Eb55F2f68a9440da38e7989210b9A05e), [`xOWL`](https://gnosisscan.io/token/0x0905Ab807F8FD040255F0cF8fa14756c1D824931), [`WETH`](https://gnosisscan.io/token/0x6A023CCd1ff6F2045C3309768eAd9E68F978f6e1), [`wstETH`](https://gnosisscan.io/address/0x6c76971f98945ae98dd7d4dfca8711ebea946ea6), [`sDAI`](https://gnosisscan.io/address/0xaf204776c7245bf4147c2612bf6e5972ee483701), [`USDC.e`](https://gnosisscan.io/address/0x2a22f9c3b484c3629090FeED35F17Ff8F88f76F0)
   </details>
 
   <details>
     <summary>Arbitrum baseline protocols and tokens</summary>
 
-    - **Protocols**:  Uniswap v2/v3, Sushiswap, Swapr, Balancer v2
+    - **Protocols**:  Uniswap v2/v3, Sushiswap, Swapr, Balancer v2, Pancakeswap
     - **Base tokens**: [`WETH`](https://arbiscan.io/token/0x82af49447d8a07e3bd95bd0d56f35241523fbab1), [`USDC`](https://arbiscan.io/token/0xaf88d065e77c8cc2239327c5edb3a432268e5831), [`USDT`](https://arbiscan.io/token/0xfd086bc7cd5c481dcc9c85ebe478a1c0b69fcbb9), [`DAI`](https://arbiscan.io/token/0xda10009cbd5d07dd0cecc66161fc93d7c9000da1), [`GNO`](https://arbiscan.io/token/0xa0b862f60edef4452f25b4160f177db44deb6cf1)
   </details>
 
+  <details>
+    <summary>Base chain baseline protocols and tokens</summary>
+
+    - **Protocols**:  Uniswap v2/v3, Balancer v2
+    - **Base tokens**: [`WETH`](https://basescan.org/address/0x420000000000000000000000000000000000000), [`USDC`](https://basescan.org/address/0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913), [`DAI`](https://basescan.org/address/0x50c5725949A6F0c72E6C4a641F24049A917DB0Cb)
+  </details>
+
 More details about how a certificate of an EBBO violation is computed, and what are the steps taken in case such a violation occurs can be found in [this](/cow-protocol/reference/core/auctions/ebbo-rules) section.
 
 - Inflation of the objective function ([CIP-11](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0x16d8c681d52b24f1ccd854084e07a99fce6a7af1e25fd21ddae6534b411df870)). Using tokens for the sole purpose of inflating the objective value or maximizing the reward is forbidden (e.g., by creating fake tokens, or wash-trading with real tokens).
@@ -76,6 +96,6 @@ More details about how a certificate of an EBBO violation is computed, and what
 
 - Local Token Conservation, aka illegal surplus shifts ([CIP-11](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0x16d8c681d52b24f1ccd854084e07a99fce6a7af1e25fd21ddae6534b411df870)). Due to the nature of batching, a solver can intentionally transfer surplus among orders that share a common token. This is not allowed, and non-trivial surplus shifts can be penalized and can lead to solver slashing.
 
-- Pennying/overbidding ([CIP-13](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0x812273c78abe1cea303d8381e1fb901a4cb701715fd24f4b769d0a0b3779b3e2)) (rule applies only on Ethereum Mainnet). Pennying or the evolution of it in the context of CIP-20 known as overbidding, is the intentional inflation of the surplus, or the reported score, by a solver, with the hope that their solution will win and that solver rewards, and/or the possibility of positive slippage, will cover the loss that they seem to be committing to. Such behavior does not benefit anyone and thus, systematically doing so can lead to solver slashing.
+- Pennying/overbidding ([CIP-13](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0x812273c78abe1cea303d8381e1fb901a4cb701715fd24f4b769d0a0b3779b3e2)). Pennying or the evolution of it in the context of CIP-20 known as overbidding, is the intentional inflation of the surplus, or the reported score, by a solver, with the hope that their solution will win and that solver rewards, and/or the possibility of positive slippage, will cover the loss that they seem to be committing to. Such behavior does not benefit anyone and thus, systematically doing so can lead to solver slashing.
 
 - Other malicious behavior ([CIP-11](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0x16d8c681d52b24f1ccd854084e07a99fce6a7af1e25fd21ddae6534b411df870)). Malicious solver behavior is not limited to the above examples. Slashing can still happen for other reasons where there is intentional harm caused to the user and/or the protocol at the discretion of the CoW DAO. A concrete example of such is a solver intentionally not including the [pre/post hooks](/cow-protocol/reference/core/intents/hooks) associated with an order.

docs/cow-protocol/reference/core/auctions/rewards.md

@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ The payment calculation can result in a negative figure, in which case the solve
 
 The payment is capped from above and below using the function $$\textrm{cap}(x) = \max(-c_l, \min(c_u, x))$$ that is chain-specific, and is determined by the following values:
 
-- Ethereum mainnet and Arbitrum: $$c_l = 0.010 \;\textrm{ETH}$$ and $$c_u = 0.012 \;\textrm{ETH}$$,
+- Ethereum mainnet, Arbitrum, and Base chain: $$c_l = 0.010 \;\textrm{ETH}$$ and $$c_u = 0.012 \;\textrm{ETH}$$,
 - Gnosis Chain: $$c_l = c_u = 10 \;\textrm{xDAI}$$.
 
 Submitted scores that are non-positive will be ignored. If only one solution is submitted, $$\textrm{referenceQuality}$$ is set to zero. Formally, this corresponds to always considering the empty solution which does not settle any trades and has quality zero as part of the submitted solutions.
@@ -84,5 +84,6 @@ As specified in [CIP-27](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0x64e061568e86e
 - Ethereum mainnet: $$\min\{0.0006 ~\textrm{ETH}, 6 ~\textrm{COW}\}$$,
 - Arbitrum: $$\min\{0.0002 ~\textrm{ETH}, 6 ~\textrm{COW}\}$$,
 - Gnosis Chain: $$\min\{0.15 ~\textrm{xDAI}, 6 ~\textrm{COW}\}$$,
+- Base Chain: $$\min\{0.0002 ~\textrm{ETH}, 6 ~\textrm{COW}\}$$,
 
 where, again, the conversion from ETH and xDAI to COW is done by using an up-to-date price (specifically, the average ETH/xDAI/COW Dune prices of the past 24h before the payout are used to determine these exchange rates).