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* more typos found during audiobook production
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Expand Up @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ Perhaps the clearest quantitative mark for this declining proactive public inter

Beyond this quantitative story, the declining appearance of public financial support for information technology development has been at least as dramatic. Where once the public sector took the lead in developing what became the internet (in the US), foundations of the personal computer and analogous projects in other democratic countries (e.g., [France’s Minitel](https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262537759/minitel/)), today almost all major breakthroughs in information technology are driven by the private sector.[^PublicInterestTech]

While the original internet was almost entirely developed by the public and academic sectors (see Chapter "[The Lost Dao](https://www.plurality.net/v/chapters/3-3/eng/?mode=dark)" below) and based on open standards, the "Web 2.0" wave that dominated the late first two decades of the new millenium and the recent movements around “web3” and decentralized social technologies have received virtually no public financial support, as governments in democratic countries struggle to explore the potential of digital currencies, payments, and identity systems. While many of the most fundamental advances in computing arose from democratic governments during World War II and the Cold War, today governments have played virtually no role in the breakthroughs in “foundation models” that are revolutionizing computer science. In fact, OpenAI Founders Sam Altman and Elon Musk [report](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/11/podcasts/transcript-ezra-klein-interviews-sam-altman.html) having initially sought government funding and only having turned to private, profit-driven sources after being repeatedly turned down; OpenAI went on to develop the Generative Pretrained Transformer (GPT) models that have increasingly captured the public’s imagination about the potential of AI.[^AltmanInterview] Again, this contrasts sharply with authoritarian regimes, like the PRC and the United Arab Emirates, that have laid out and to a large extent successfully deployed ambitious public information technology strategies, including developing their own [cutting-edge competitors to GPTs](https://falconllm.tii.ae/).[^TechStrategyPRC]
While the original internet was almost entirely developed by the public and academic sectors (see Chapter "[The Lost Dao](https://www.plurality.net/v/chapters/3-3/eng/?mode=dark)" below) and based on open standards, the "Web 2.0" wave that dominated the late first two decades of the new millennium and the recent movements around “web3” and decentralized social technologies have received virtually no public financial support, as governments in democratic countries struggle to explore the potential of digital currencies, payments, and identity systems. While many of the most fundamental advances in computing arose from democratic governments during World War II and the Cold War, today governments have played virtually no role in the breakthroughs in “foundation models” that are revolutionizing computer science. In fact, OpenAI Founders Sam Altman and Elon Musk [report](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/11/podcasts/transcript-ezra-klein-interviews-sam-altman.html) having initially sought government funding and only having turned to private, profit-driven sources after being repeatedly turned down; OpenAI went on to develop the Generative Pretrained Transformer (GPT) models that have increasingly captured the public’s imagination about the potential of AI.[^AltmanInterview] Again, this contrasts sharply with authoritarian regimes, like the PRC and the United Arab Emirates, that have laid out and to a large extent successfully deployed ambitious public information technology strategies, including developing their own [cutting-edge competitors to GPTs](https://falconllm.tii.ae/).[^TechStrategyPRC]


This lack of public sector engagement with technology extends beyond research and development to deployment, adoption, and facilitation. The easiest areas to measure this are the quality and availability of digital connectivity and education. Here the data are somewhat mixed, as many high-functioning democracies (such as the Scandinavian countries) have high quality and high availability internet. But it is striking that leading authoritarian regimes dramatically outperform democracies at similar development levels, especially in the latest connectivity technology. For example, according to Speedtest.net, the PRC ranks 16th in internet speeds in the world, while only 72nd in income per head; Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies similarly punch above their weight[^DigitalDisconnect]. Performance on 5G, the latest generation of mobile connectivity, is more dramatic: a range of surveys find Saudi Arabia and the PRC consistently in the top 10 best-covered jurisdictions by 5G, far above their income levels.
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[^ngrams]: Derived from Google nGrams viewer at https://books.google.com/ngrams.

Furthermore, these investments are not just choices that could have been made differently; they are quite recent and were made very differently immediately prior. These investments are reflected in the canonical technologies of the last few decades. Artificial intelligence was heralded as a coming revolution throughout much of the 1980s, as reflected in Figure E showing the relative frequency of this phrase in English books as tracked by Google nGrams. Yet the defining technology of the 1980s was quite opposite: the personal computer that made computing a complement to individual human creativity. The 1990s were haunted by Stephenson’s science fictional imagination of the possibilities of escapist virtual worlds and atomizing cryptography, the connective tissue of the internet swept the world, ushering in an unprecedented age of communication and cooperation. Mobile telephony in the 2000s, social networking in the 2010s, and the scaffolding of remote work in the 2020s…none of these have focused on either cryptographic hypercapitalism or artificial superintelligence. This reflects, with an extensive lag, the shift in investments made by public sector research funders away from supporting these technologies and towards investment in cryptography and artificial intelligence, as we discuss and document in "The Lost Dao" below, driven by a variety of (geo)poltiical factors.
Furthermore, these investments are not just choices that could have been made differently; they are quite recent and were made very differently immediately prior. These investments are reflected in the canonical technologies of the last few decades. Artificial intelligence was heralded as a coming revolution throughout much of the 1980s, as reflected in Figure E showing the relative frequency of this phrase in English books as tracked by Google nGrams. Yet the defining technology of the 1980s was quite opposite: the personal computer that made computing a complement to individual human creativity. The 1990s were haunted by Stephenson’s science fictional imagination of the possibilities of escapist virtual worlds and atomizing cryptography, the connective tissue of the internet swept the world, ushering in an unprecedented age of communication and cooperation. Mobile telephony in the 2000s, social networking in the 2010s, and the scaffolding of remote work in the 2020s…none of these have focused on either cryptographic hypercapitalism or artificial superintelligence. This reflects, with an extensive lag, the shift in investments made by public sector research funders away from supporting these technologies and towards investment in cryptography and artificial intelligence, as we discuss and document in "The Lost Dao" below, driven by a variety of (geo)political factors.

### Ideologies of the twenty-first century

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Expand Up @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ On the horizon, shared ISR is poised for rapid expansion. Technological advance

### Copresence today

Throughout history of the most meaningful human experiences involve multisensory copresence. Religious observances often engage many senses in large groups. Clubs and parties are among the most treasured entertainment experiences because of their multisesnory activation. Political rallies, group assemblies (whether at schools or for concerts), collective outings (hiking, sports, etc.) all engage a range of sense.
Throughout history of the most meaningful human experiences involve multisensory copresence. Religious observances often engage many senses in large groups. Clubs and parties are among the most treasured entertainment experiences because of their multisensory activation. Political rallies, group assemblies (whether at schools or for concerts), collective outings (hiking, sports, etc.) all engage a range of sense.

Technology has increasingly played a role in facilitating such copresence, especially at a distance, in recent years. ISR refers to technology that creates a shared virtual environment where users can interact in real-time. This type of “reality” can be considered a subset application of Mediated Reality as illustrated in Figure A, a broader term that encompasses various technologies that mediate our perception of reality, including Virtual, Augmented and Mixed Reality (a.k.a. VR, AR, MR).

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4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions contents/english/7-0-policy.md
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Expand Up @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ Yet while these technology hubs have become the envy and aspiration of (typicall
Yet while dictating this mission, Lick did not prejudge the right components to achieve it, instead establishing a network of "coopetitive" research labs, each experimenting and racing to develop prototypes of different components of these systems that could then be standardized in interaction with each other and spread across the network. Private sector collaborators played important roles in contributing to this development, including Bolt Beranek and Newman (where Lick served as Vice President just before his role at IPTO and which went on to build a number of prototype systems for the internet) and Xerox PARC (where many of the researchers Lick supported later assembled and continued their work, especially after federal funding diminished). Yet, as is standard in the development and procurement of infrastructure and public works in a city, these roles were components of an overall vision and plan developed by the networked, multi-sectoral alliance that constituted ARPANET. Contrast this with a model primarily developed and driven in the interest of private corporations, the basis for most personal computing and mobile operating systems, social networks and cloud infrastructures.


As we have noted repeatedly above, we need not only look back to the "good old days" for ARPANET or Taiwan for inspiration. India's development of the "[Indiastack](https://indiastack.org/)" has many similar characteristics.[^Indiastack] More recently, the EU has been developing initiatives including [European Digital Identity](https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/european-digital-identity_en)and [Gaia-X](https://gaia-x.eu/). Jurisdictions as diverse as [Brazil](https://www.bcb.gov.br/en/financialstability/pix_en) and [Singapore](https://www.abs.org.sg/consumer-banking/fast) have experimented successfully with similar approaches. While each of these initiatives has strengths and weaknesses, the idea that a public mission aimed at creating infrastructure that empowers decentralized innovation in collaboration with civil society and participation but not dominance from the private sector is increasingly a pattern, often labeled "digital public infrastructure" (DPI). To a large extent, we are primarily advocating for this approach to be scaled up and become the central approach to the development of global ⿻ society. Yet for this to occur, the ARPA and Taiwan models need to be updated and adjusted for this potentially dramatically increased scale and ambition.
As we have noted repeatedly above, we need not only look back to the "good old days" for ARPANET or Taiwan for inspiration. India's development of the "[India Stack](https://indiastack.org/)" has many similar characteristics.[^Indiastack] More recently, the EU has been developing initiatives including [European Digital Identity](https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/european-digital-identity_en)and [Gaia-X](https://gaia-x.eu/). Jurisdictions as diverse as [Brazil](https://www.bcb.gov.br/en/financialstability/pix_en) and [Singapore](https://www.abs.org.sg/consumer-banking/fast) have experimented successfully with similar approaches. While each of these initiatives has strengths and weaknesses, the idea that a public mission aimed at creating infrastructure that empowers decentralized innovation in collaboration with civil society and participation but not dominance from the private sector is increasingly a pattern, often labeled "digital public infrastructure" (DPI). To a large extent, we are primarily advocating for this approach to be scaled up and become the central approach to the development of global ⿻ society. Yet for this to occur, the ARPA and Taiwan models need to be updated and adjusted for this potentially dramatically increased scale and ambition.

[^Indiastack]: Vivek Raghavan, Sanjay Jain and Pramod Varma, "India Stack—Digital Infrastructure as Public Good", *Communications of the ACM* 62, no. 11: 76-81.

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[^econdem]: Hitzig et al., op. cit.

Mandating interoperability, in cooperation with standard setting processes that develop the meaning and shape of these standards, is a critical lever to make such standards workable and avoid dominance by an illegitimate private monopoly. Financial regulations help define what kinds of governance are acceptable in various jurisdictions and have unfortunately, especially in the US and UK, weighed heavily towards damaging and monpolistic one-share-one-vote rules. Financial regulatory reform should encourage experimentation with more inclusive governance systems such as Quadratic and other ⿻ voting forms that account for and address concentrations of power continuously, rather than offsetting the tendencies of one-share-one-vote to raiding with bespoke provisions like "poison pills".[^QVcorp] They should also accommodate and support worker, supplier, environmental counterparty and customer voice and steer concentrated asset holders who might otherwise have systemic monopolistic effects towards employing similar tools.
Mandating interoperability, in cooperation with standard setting processes that develop the meaning and shape of these standards, is a critical lever to make such standards workable and avoid dominance by an illegitimate private monopoly. Financial regulations help define what kinds of governance are acceptable in various jurisdictions and have unfortunately, especially in the US and UK, weighed heavily towards damaging and monopolistic one-share-one-vote rules. Financial regulatory reform should encourage experimentation with more inclusive governance systems such as Quadratic and other ⿻ voting forms that account for and address concentrations of power continuously, rather than offsetting the tendencies of one-share-one-vote to raiding with bespoke provisions like "poison pills".[^QVcorp] They should also accommodate and support worker, supplier, environmental counterparty and customer voice and steer concentrated asset holders who might otherwise have systemic monopolistic effects towards employing similar tools.

[^QVcorp]: Eric A. Posner and E. Glen Weyl, "Quadratic Voting as Efficient Corporate Governance", *University of Chicago Law Review* 81, no. 1 (2014): 241-272.

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