* add blank lines before lists

contents/english/3-0-what-is-⿻.md

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ To be more precise, we can break Plurality into three components (descriptive, n
 Given this rich definition and the way it blends together elements from traditional Mandarin and various English traditions, throughout the rest of the book we use the Unicode ⿻ to represent this idea set in both noun form (viz. to stand in for "Plurality") and in the adjective form (viz. to stand in for 數位). 
 
 In English this may be read in a variety of ways depending on context:
+
 - As "Plurality" typically when used as a concept;[^Taiwan]
 - As "digital", "plural", "shuwei", "digital/plural" or even as a range of other things such as "intersectional", "collaborative" or "networked" when used as an adjective;
 

contents/english/3-2-connected-society.md

@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ Yet, as attractive as this argument has proven to politicians and intellectuals
 
 
 Given this is a book about technology, an elegant illustration is the San Francisco Bay Area, where both authors and George himself  lived parts of their lives and which has some of the most expensive land in the world.  To whom does the enormous value of this land belong?  
+
 * Certainly not to the homeowners who simply had the good fortune of seeing the computer industry grow up around them.  Then perhaps to the cities in the region?  Many reformers have argued these cities, which are in any case fragmented and tend to block development, can hardly take credit for the miraculous increase in land values.  
 * Perhaps Stanford University and the University of California at Berkeley, to which various scholars have attributed much of the dynamism of Silicon Valley?[^Sax]  Certainly these played some role, but it would be strange to attribute the full value of Bay Area land to two universities, especially when these universities succeeded with the financial support of the US government and the collaboration of other universities across the country.
 *  Perhaps the State of California?  Arguably the national defense industry, research complex that created the internet (as we discuss below) and political institutions played a far greater role than anything at the state level.  

contents/english/4-1-identity-and-personhood.md

@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ Thus, identity systems are central to digital life and gate access to most onlin
 At the same time, many of the simplest ways to establish identity paradoxically simultaneously undermine it, especially online.  A password is often used to establish an identity, but unless such authentication is conducted with great care it can reveal the password more broadly, making it useless for authentication in the future as attackers will be able to impersonate them.   "Privacy" is often dismissed as "nice to have" and especially useful for those who "have something to hide".  But in identity systems, the protection of private information is the very core of utility.  Any useful identity system has to be judged on its ability to simultaneously establish and protect identities.
 
 To see how this challenge plays out, it is important to keep in mind the several interlocking elements of identity systems:
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 - Creation: Enrolling in an identity system involves establishing an account and getting assigned an identifier. Different types of systems have different requirements for enrollment related to how confident the system owner is in the identifying information presented by an individual (called [Levels of Assurance](https://id4d.worldbank.org/guide/levels-assurance-loas))[^ICAO].
 - Access: To access the account on an on-going basis, the  participant uses a simpler process, such as presenting a password, a key or a [multi-factor authentication](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multi-factor_authentication).
 - Linkage: As the participant engages with the systems that their account gives them access to, many of their interactions are recorded and form part of the record that constitutes the system's understanding of them, information that can later be used for other account functions.
@@ -56,6 +57,7 @@ In this chapter, we discuss the operation of existing digital identity systems a
 ### Digital identity today
 
 When most people think of their formal "identity", they are usually referring to government issued documents.  While these vary across countries, common examples include
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 - Birth certificates;
 - Certificates of enrollment in public programs, often with an associated identification number (such as Social Security for pensions and taxes in the US or the Taiwanese National Health Insurance program);
 - Licenses for use of potentially hazardous tools, such as automobiles or firearms;
@@ -83,6 +85,7 @@ They similarly rely on rich signals, with high integrity and fairly broad use, b
 At a neat half-way point between these extremes in most countries sit accounts for crucial/foundational services such as bank accounts and mobile telephones. Banking is typically regulated by the government and requires government issued ID before you can enroll (a process known as "know your customer" or KYC). Telecommunications providers often ask for government issued ID to support effective account management (where do we send the bill) and recovery (I lost my phone. Yes it is me.) and in some countries they are required to know who their customers are before they can get a phone number.  Both banks and telephone companies are privately administered and linked to rich user data that can be harnessed for security, and thus often become a crucial input to other identity systems (like SSO systems), but are typically far more regulated than SSO systems and thus typically have greater legitimacy and portability across private providers. In many contexts these systems are thus viewed as a useful combination of security and legitimacy, anchoring ultimate security for many services through multifactor authentication.  However, they at the same time suffer many of the flaws of both corporate surveillance and insecurity, as both can be relatively easily stolen, are hard to recover if stolen and lack the strong legal grounding of government-issued IDs.
 
 In a different direction entirely from this spectrum are smaller, more diverse, and more local identity systems, in both more traditional contexts and digitally native contexts. Examples of these are explored by Kaliya Young in her book [*Domains of Identity*](https://www.identitywoman.net/wp-content/uploads/Domains-of-Identity-Highlights.pdf):[^Young] 
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 - Civil society enrollment and transaction, such as educational credentials, membership in professional associations and trade-unions, political parties and religious organizations.
 - Employment enrollment and transactions, such as work-related credentials and access.
 - Commercial enrollment and transaction, such as loyalty cards and membership in private insurance. 
@@ -142,6 +145,7 @@ Is there a way past this seemingly irreconcilable conflict, ensuring secure esta
 
 
 The basic idea reason can be understood perhaps most easily by contrast to biometrics.  Biometrics (e.g. iris scans, fingerprints, genetic information) is a detailed set of physical information that uniquely identifies a person and that in principle anyone with access to that person and appropriate technology may ascertain.  Yet people are not just biological but sociological beings.  Far richer than their biometric profile is the set of shared histories and interactions they have with other people and social groups.  These may include biometrics; after all, anytime we meet someone in person we at least partly perceive their biometrics and they may leave traces of others behind. But they are far from limited to them.  Instead they encompass all behaviors and traits that  are naturally jointly observed in the course of social interactions, including
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 * Location, as the very act of being together in a place implies joint knowledge of others' locations (which is the basis of alibis in forensics) and most people spend most of their time in the detectable vicinity of other
 * Communication, as it always has at least two participants
 * Actions, whether at work, play or workshop are usually performed for or in the presence of some audience...in fact, as we quoted in our chapter [What is ⿻?](https://www.plurality.net/v/chapters/3-0/eng/?mode=dark), this is how Hannah Arendt defines "action".
@@ -151,6 +155,7 @@ In fact, the way we think of others identities are usually primarily in terms of
 
 
 This social, ⿻  approach to online identity was pioneered by danah boyd in her astonishingly farsighted masters thesis on "faceted identity" more than 20 years ago.[^boyd]  While she focused primarily on the benefits of such a system for feelings of personal agency (in the spirit of Simmel), the potential benefits for the balance between identity establishment and protection are even more astonishing:
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 * Comprehensiveness and redundancy: 'Jointly, these data cover almost everything meaningful there is to know about a person; the great majority of what we are is determined by various interactions and experiences shared with others.  For almost anything we might want to prove to a stranger, there are some combination of people and institutions (typically many) who can "vouch" for this information without any dedicated strategy of surveillance. For example, a person wanting to prove that they are above a particularly age could call on friends who have known them for a long time, the school they attended, doctors who verified their age at various times as well, of course, on governments who verified their age. Such ⿻ attribute verification systems are actually fairly common: when applying for some forms of government identification many jurisdictions allow a variety of attribute-proving methods for addresses including bank statements, utility bills, leases etc.
 * Privacy:  Perhaps even more interestingly, all of these "issuers" of attributes know this information from interactions that most of us feel consistent with "privacy": we do not get concerned about the co-knowledge of these social facts in the way we would surveillance by a corporation or government.  However, we will be more precise in the next chapter about the sense in which these (should/could) approaches allay privacy concerns.
 * Progressive authentication: While standard verification by a single factor allows the user to gain confidence in the attested fact/attribute equal to their confidence in the verifying party/system, such ⿻ systems allow a wide range of confidence to be achieved by drawing on more and more trusted issuers of attributes.  This allows adaptation to a variety of use cases based on the security they require.
@@ -163,6 +168,7 @@ This social, ⿻  approach to online identity was pioneered by danah boyd in her
 [^DecentSociety]: Puja Ohlhaver, E. Glen Weyl and Vitalik Buterin, "Decentralized Society: Finding Web3's Soul", 2022 at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4105763.
 
 The above benefits are remarkable when compared to the trade-offs described above.  But essentially they are fairly simple extensions of the benefits we discussed in [The Lost Dao](https://www.plurality.net/v/chapters/3-3/eng/?mode=dark) that ⿻ structures generally have over more centralized ones, the benefits that motivated the move to packet switching architectures for communications networks in the first place.  This is why some of the leading organizations seeking to achieve a future like this, such as the [Trust over IP Foundation](https://trustoverip.org/), draw tight analogies to the history of the creation of the internet protocols themselves. There are of course many technical and social challenges in making such a ⿻ system work:
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 * Inter-operation: Making such as system work would obviously require a very wide range of present identity and information systems to interoperate, while maintaining their independence and integrity.  Achieving this would obviously be a herculean task of coordination, but it is fundamentally a similar one to that underlying the internet itself.
 * Complexity: Managing and processing trust and verification relationships with such a diversity of individuals and institutions is beyond the capacity of most people or even institutions.  Yet there are several natural approaches to addressing this complexity.  One is to harness the growing capacity of GFMs, trained to adapt to the relationships and context of the individual or institution using the model, to extract meaning from such diverse signals; we discuss this possibility extensively in a [later chapter](https://www.plurality.net/v/chapters/5-5/eng/?mode=dark) on Adaptive Administration.  Another approach is to limit the number of relationships any individual or institution has to manage and rely on either institutions of medium size (e.g. medium businesses, churches, etc.) that play an intermediary roles (which Jaron Lanier and one of us have called "mediators of individual data or [MIDs](https://hbr.org/2018/09/a-blueprint-for-a-better-digital-society)) or on "friends of friends" relationships (which we call "transitive trust") which are known to connect, within a small number of links (roughly six), almost any two people on earth.[^MIDs]  We will discuss the appeal, trade-offs and compatibility between these two approaches below.
 * Trust at a distance: Another closely related problem is that many of the natural verifiers for strangers we meet may be people who we do not know ourselves.  Here again, some combination of using transitive trust and MIDs as we discuss shortly is natural.  Currency, as we will discuss in a [later chapter](https://www.plurality.net/v/chapters/4-3/eng/?mode=dark) of this part of the book, may also play a role here.

contents/english/4-4-property-and-contract.md

@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ Tools to address these challenges are more statistical than cryptographic.  Diff
 All these techniques have fallen somewhat behind the speed, scale and power of the development of GFMs.  For example, differential privacy focuses mostly on the literal statistical recoverability of facts, whereas GFMs are often capable of performing "reasoning" as a detective would, inferring for example someone's first school from a constellation of only loosely related facts about later schools, friendships, etc.   Harnessing the capacity of these models to tackle these technical challenges and deriving technical standard definitions of data protection and attribution, especially as models further progress, will be central to making data collaboration sustainable.
 
 Yet many of the challenges to data collaboration are more organizational and social than purely technical.  As we noted earlier, interests in data are rarely individual as almost all data are relational.  Even beyond this most fundamental point, there are many reasons why organizing data rights and control at the individual level is impractical including:
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 - Social leakage: Even when data do not directly arise from a social interaction, they almost always have social implications.  For example, because of the shared genetic structure of relatives, something like a 1% statistical sample of a population allows the identification of any individual from their genetic profile, making the preservation of genetic privacy a profoundly social undertaking.
 - Management challenges: it is nearly impossible for an individual alone to understand the implications, both financial and personal, of sharing data in various ways.  While automated tools can help, these will be made or shaped by social groups, who will need to be fiduciaries for these individuals.
 - Collective bargaining: The primary consumers of large data sets are the largest and most powerful corporations in the world.  The billions of data creators around the world can only achieve reasonable terms in any arrangement with them, and these companies could only engage in good faith negotiations, if data creators act collectively.

contents/english/5-0-collaborative-technology-and-democracy.md

@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ For those with a more practical and quantitative orientation, however, perhaps o
 [^Galorpaper]: Quamrul Ashraf and Oded Galor, "The 'Out of Africa' Hypothesis, Human Genetic Diversity, and Comparative Economic Development", *American Economic Review* 103, no.1 (2013): 1-46.
 
 While using migratory distance from Africa (where diversity is maximum as noted above) as a proxy for "diversity", Galor and collaborators have [since argued](https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/roots-cultural-diversity) that diversity takes a wide range of forms and leads to a broad range of divergent outcomes.[^MoreGalor]  Today the word "diversity" is in many contexts used to specify some dimensions along which oppression was historically organized in societies like the US that are particularly culturally dominant in the world today.  Yet such a definition is simplistic relative to the tremendous diversity of forms of diversity that define our world:
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 * Religion and religiosity: A diverse range of religious practices, including secularism, agnosticism and forms of atheism, are central to the metaphysical, epistemological and ethical perspective of most people around the world.
 * Jurisdiction: People are citizens of a range of jurisdictions, including nation states, provinces, cities etc.
 * Geographic type: People live in different types of geographic regions: rural v. urban, cosmopolitan v. more traditional cities, differing weather patterns, proximity to geographic features etc.