Merge pull request #4213 from jepler/raspberrypi-urandom2

raspberrypi: implement os.urandom

extmod/crypto-algorithms/sha256.c

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 
 /*************************** HEADER FILES ***************************/
 #include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
 #include "sha256.h"
 
 /****************************** MACROS ******************************/

ports/raspberrypi/Makefile

@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ SRC_C += \
 	audio_dma.c \
 	background.c \
 	peripherals/pins.c \
+	extmod/crypto-algorithms/sha256.c \
 	fatfs_port.c \
 	lib/libc/string0.c \
 	lib/mp-readline/readline.c \

ports/raspberrypi/common-hal/os/__init__.c

@@ -30,6 +30,11 @@
 #include "py/objtuple.h"
 #include "py/qstr.h"
 
+#include "extmod/crypto-algorithms/sha256.h"
+
+#include "hardware/structs/rosc.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
 
 STATIC const qstr os_uname_info_fields[] = {
     MP_QSTR_sysname, MP_QSTR_nodename,
@@ -57,6 +62,64 @@ mp_obj_t common_hal_os_uname(void) {
     return (mp_obj_t)&os_uname_info_obj;
 }
 
+// NIST Special Publication 800-90B (draft) recommends several extractors,
+// including the SHA hash family and states that if the amount of entropy input
+// is twice the number of bits output from them, that output can be considered
+// essentially fully random.  If every RANDOM_SAFETY_MARGIN bits from
+// `rosc_hw->randombit` have at least 1 bit of entropy, then this criterion is met.
+//
+// This works by seeding the `random_state` with plenty of random bits (SHA256
+// as entropy harvesting function), then using that state it as a counter input
+// (SHA256 as a CSPRNG), re-seeding at least every 256 blocks (8kB).
+//
+// In practice, `PractRand` doesn't detect any gross problems with the output
+// random numbers on samples of 1 to 8 megabytes, no matter the setting of
+// RANDOM_SAFETY_MARGIN.  (it does detect "unusual" results from time to time,
+// as it will with any RNG)
+#define RANDOM_SAFETY_MARGIN (4)
+
+static BYTE random_state[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE];
+static void seed_random_bits(BYTE out[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE]) {
+    CRYAL_SHA256_CTX context;
+    sha256_init(&context);
+    for (int i=0; i<2*RANDOM_SAFETY_MARGIN; i++) {
+        for(int j=0; j<SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE; j++) {
+            out[j] = rosc_hw->randombit & 1;
+            for(int k=0; k<8; k++) {
+                out[j] = (out[j] << 1) ^ (rosc_hw->randombit & 1);
+            }
+        }
+        sha256_update(&context, out, SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE);
+    }
+    sha256_final(&context, out);
+}
+
+static void get_random_bits(BYTE out[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE]) {
+    if (!random_state[0]++) {
+        seed_random_bits(random_state);
+    }
+    CRYAL_SHA256_CTX context;
+    sha256_init(&context);
+    sha256_update(&context, random_state, SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE);
+    sha256_final(&context, out);
+}
+
 bool common_hal_os_urandom(uint8_t* buffer, uint32_t length) {
-    return false;
+#define ROSC_POWER_SAVE (1) // assume ROSC is not necessarily active all the time
+#if ROSC_POWER_SAVE
+    uint32_t old_rosc_ctrl = rosc_hw->ctrl;
+    rosc_hw->ctrl = (old_rosc_ctrl & ~ROSC_CTRL_ENABLE_BITS) | (ROSC_CTRL_ENABLE_VALUE_ENABLE << 12);
+#endif
+    while (length) {
+        size_t n = MIN(length, SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE);
+        BYTE sha_buf[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE];
+        get_random_bits(sha_buf);
+        memcpy(buffer, sha_buf, n);
+        buffer += n;
+        length -= n;
+    }
+#if ROSC_POWER_SAVE
+    rosc_hw->ctrl = old_rosc_ctrl;
+#endif
+    return true;
 }