diff --git a/.pre-commit-config.yaml b/.pre-commit-config.yaml
index 3d89ddfa1..facfd8f7d 100644
--- a/.pre-commit-config.yaml
+++ b/.pre-commit-config.yaml
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 repos:
   - repo: https://github.com/astral-sh/ruff-pre-commit
-    rev: v0.9.2
+    rev: v0.9.3
     hooks:
       - id: ruff
         args: [ --fix ]
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ repos:
       - id: sphinx-lint
 #  Configuration for codespell is in pyproject.toml
   - repo: https://github.com/codespell-project/codespell
-    rev: v2.3.0
+    rev: v2.4.0
     hooks:
     - id: codespell
       exclude: (package-lock.json|/locale/)
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index f86b8a8af..8dfe6c3e5 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ This is a major release with **BREAKING** changes. Please make sure to review th
 * **New feature**: The new setting `ERROR_RESPONSE_WITH_SCOPES` can now be set to True to include required
   scopes when DRF authorization fails due to improper scopes.
 * **New feature**: The new setting `REFRESH_TOKEN_GRACE_PERIOD_SECONDS` controls a grace period during which
-  refresh tokens may be re-used.
+  refresh tokens may be reused.
 * An `app_authorized` signal is fired when a token is generated.
 
 ## 1.0.0 [2017-06-07]
diff --git a/tests/test_authorization_code.py b/tests/test_authorization_code.py
index 122474950..f162e211a 100644
--- a/tests/test_authorization_code.py
+++ b/tests/test_authorization_code.py
@@ -989,7 +989,7 @@ def test_refresh_fail_repeating_requests(self):
     def test_refresh_repeating_requests_revokes_old_token(self):
         """
         If a refresh token is reused, the server should invalidate *all* access tokens that have a relation
-        to the re-used token. This forces a malicious actor to be logged out.
+        to the reused token. This forces a malicious actor to be logged out.
         The server can't determine whether the first or the second client was legitimate, so it needs to
         revoke both.
         See https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-29#name-recommendations