diff --git a/docs/architecture/README.md b/docs/architecture/README.md
index 2b817016b1..cd72bb8db9 100644
--- a/docs/architecture/README.md
+++ b/docs/architecture/README.md
@@ -27,4 +27,5 @@ To suggest an ADR, please make use of the [ADR template](./adr-template.md) prov
 
 | ADR \# | Description | Status |
 | ------ | ----------- | ------ |
-| [001](./adr-001-key-assignment.md) | Consumer chain key assignment | Accepted, Implemented |
\ No newline at end of file
+| [001](./adr-001-key-assignment.md) | Consumer chain key assignment | Accepted, Implemented |
+| [003](./adr-003-equivocation-gov-proposal.md) | Equivocation governance proposal | Accepted, Implemented |
diff --git a/docs/architecture/adr-003-equivocation-gov-proposal.md b/docs/architecture/adr-003-equivocation-gov-proposal.md
new file mode 100644
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@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+# ADR 003: Equivocation governance proposal
+
+## Changelog
+* 2023-02-06: Initial draft
+
+## Status
+
+Accepted
+
+## Context
+
+We want to limit the possibilities of a consumer chain to execute actions on the provider chain to maintain and ensure optimum security of the provider chain.
+
+For instance, a malicious consumer consumer chain can send slash packet to the provider chain, which will slash a validator without the need of providing an evidence.
+
+## Decision
+
+To protect against a malicious consumer chain, slash packets unrelated to downtime are ignored by the provider chain. Thus, an other mechanism is required to punish validators that have committed a double-sign on a consumer chain.
+
+A new kind of governance proposal is added to the `provider` module, allowing to slash and tombstone a validator for double-signing in case of any harmful action on the consumer chain.
+
+If such proposal passes, the proposal handler delegates to the `evidence` module to process the equivocation. This module ensures the evidence isn’t too old, or else ignores it (see [code](https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/blob/21021b837882d1d40f1d79bcbc4fad2e79a3fefe/x/evidence/keeper/infraction.go#L54-L62)). *Too old* is determined by 2 consensus params : 
+
+- `evidence.max_age_duration` number of nanoseconds before an evidence is considered too old
+- `evidence.max_age_numblocks` number of blocks before an evidence is considered too old.
+
+On the hub, those parameters are equals to 
+
+```json
+// From https://cosmos-rpc.polkachu.com/consensus_params?height=13909682
+(...)
+"evidence": {
+	"max_age_num_blocks": "1000000",
+	"max_age_duration": "172800000000000",
+  (...)
+},
+(...)
+```
+
+A governance proposal takes 14 days, so those parameters must be big enough so the evidence provided in the proposal is not ignored by the `evidence` module when the proposal passes and is handled by the hub.
+
+For `max_age_num_blocks=1M`, the parameter is big enough if we consider the hub produces 12k blocks per day (`blocks_per_year/365 = 436,0000/365`). The evidence can be up to 83 days old (`1,000,000/12,000`) and not be ignored.
+
+For `max_age_duration=172,800,000,000,000`, the parameter is too low, because the value is in nanoseconds so it’s 2 days. Fortunately the condition that checks those 2 parameters uses a **AND**, so if `max_age_num_blocks` condition passes, the evidence won’t be ignored.
+
+## Consequences
+
+### Positive
+
+* Remove the possibility from a malicious consumer chain to “attack” the provider chain by slashing/jailing validators.
+* Provide a more acceptable implementation for the validator community.
+
+### Negative
+
+* Punishment action of double-signing isn’t “automated”, a governance proposal is required which takes more time.
+* You need to pay 250ATOM to submit an equivocation evidence.
+
+### Neutral
+
+## References
+
+* PR that ignores non downtime slash packet : [https://github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/pull/692](https://github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/pull/692)
+* PR that adds the governance slash proposal: [https://github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/pull/703](https://github.com/cosmos/interchain-security/pull/703)