Merge pull request #56 from IdentityPython/add_on_documentation

Added add_on documentation.

doc/source/add_on/dpop.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+.. _dpop:
+
+************************************
+Demonstration of Proof-of-possession
+************************************
+
+------------
+Introduction
+------------
+
+In the traditional mechanism, API access is allowed only if the access
+token presented by the client application is valid. However, if a
+mechanism of PoP (Proof of Possession) such as DPoP is employed,
+the API implementation additionally checks whether the client
+application presenting the access token is the valid owner of the
+access token (= whether the client application is the same one that
+the access token has been issued to). If the client is not the valid
+owner of the access token, the API access is rejected.
+
+The `DPOP Internet draft`_ describes a mechanism for sender-constraining
+OAuth 2.0 tokens via a proof-of-possession mechanism on the application
+level. This mechanism allows for the detection of replay attacks with
+access and refresh tokens.
+
+-------------
+Configuration
+-------------
+
+The only thing you can chose is the signing algorithms.
+There are no default algorithms.
+
+-------
+Example
+-------
+
+What you have to do is to add a *dpop* section to an *add_ons* section
+in a client configuration.
+
+.. code:: python
+
+    'add_ons': {
+        "dpop": {
+            "function": "oidcrp.oauth2.add_on.dpop.add_support",
+            "kwargs": {
+                "signing_algorithms": ["ES256", "ES512"]
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+
+.. _DPOP Internet draft: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop/

doc/source/add_on/index.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+OIDCRP add on documentation
+===========================
+
+.. toctree::
+
+   dpop.rst
+   pkce.rst
+   pushed_authorization.rst
+
+
+Indices and tables
+==================
+
+* :ref:`genindex`
+* :ref:`modindex`
+* :ref:`search`

doc/source/add_on/pkce.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+.. _pkce:
+
+***************************
+Proof Key for Code Exchange
+***************************
+
+------------
+Introduction
+------------
+
+
+
+OAuth 2.0 public clients utilizing the Authorization Code Grant are
+susceptible to the authorization code interception attack.  `RFC7636`_
+describes the attack as well as a technique to mitigate
+against the threat through the use of Proof Key for Code Exchange
+(PKCE, pronounced "pixy").
+
+-------------
+Configuration
+-------------
+
+You can set *code_challenge_length* and *code_challenge_method*.
+Both have defaults:
+
+- code_challenge_length: 64 and
+- code_challenge_method: S256
+
+*S256* is mandatory to implement so there should be good reasons for
+not choosing it. To other defined method is *plain*. *plain* should only
+be used when you rely on the operating system and transport
+security not to disclose the request to an attacker.
+
+The security model relies on the fact that the code verifier is not
+learned or guessed by the attacker.  It is vitally important to
+adhere to this principle.  As such, the code verifier has to be
+created in such a manner that it is cryptographically random and has
+high entropy that it is not practical for the attacker to guess.
+
+The client SHOULD create a "code_verifier" with a minimum of 256 bits
+of entropy.  This can be done by having a suitable random number
+generator create a 32-octet sequence.
+
+code_challenge_length is the length of that sequence.
+
+-------
+Example
+-------
+
+.. code:: python
+
+    "add_ons": {
+        "pkce": {
+            "function": "oidcrp.oauth2.add_on.pkce.add_support",
+            "kwargs": {
+                "code_challenge_length": 64,
+                "code_challenge_method": "S256"
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+.. _RFC7636: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7636

doc/source/add_on/pushed_authorization.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+.. _par:
+
+********************
+Pushed Authorization
+********************
+
+------------
+Introduction
+------------
+
+https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-lodderstedt-oauth-par-00.html
+
+The Internet draft defines the pushed authorization request endpoint,
+which allows clients to push the payload of an OAuth 2.0 authorization
+request to the authorization server via a direct request and provides
+them with a request URI that is used as reference to the data in a
+subsequent authorization request.

doc/source/index.rst

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Welcome to oidcrp's documentation!
 
    rp_handler.rst
    oidcrp.rst
-
+   add_on/index.rst
 
 Indices and tables
 ==================

src/oidcrp/oauth2/add_on/dpop.py

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
 from typing import Optional
-from typing import Union
 import uuid
 
 from cryptojwt.jwk.jwk import key_from_jwk_dict
@@ -143,12 +142,12 @@ def dpop_header(service_context: ServiceContext,
     return headers
 
 
-def add_support(services, signing_algorithms: Optional[list] = None):
+def add_support(services, signing_algorithms):
     """
     Add the necessary pieces to make pushed authorization happen.
 
     :param services: A dictionary with all the services the client has access to.
-    :param signing_algorithms:
+    :param signing_algorithms: Allowed signing algorithms, there is no default algorithms
     """
 
     # Access token request should use DPoP header
@@ -163,4 +162,4 @@ def add_support(services, signing_algorithms: Optional[list] = None):
     # The same for userinfo requests
     _userinfo_service = services.get("userinfo")
     if _userinfo_service:
-        _userinfo_service.construct_extra_headers.append(dpop_header)
+        _userinfo_service.construct_extra_headers.append(dpop_header)

src/oidcrp/oauth2/add_on/pushed_authorization.py

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ def push_authorization(request_args, service, **kwargs):
 def add_support(services, body_format="jws", signing_algorithm="RS256",
                 http_client=None, merge_rule="strict"):
     """
-    Add the necessary pieces to make pushed authorization happen.
+    Add the necessary pieces to make Demonstration of proof of possession (DPOP).
 
     :param merge_rule:
     :param http_client: